{"id":835,"date":"2026-10-05T14:59:15","date_gmt":"2026-10-05T14:59:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/amurasolutions.com\/?p=835"},"modified":"2026-10-14T15:01:46","modified_gmt":"2026-10-14T15:01:46","slug":"maritime-safety-a-personal-look","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/amurasolutions.com\/index.php\/en\/2026\/10\/05\/maritime-safety-a-personal-look\/","title":{"rendered":"Maritime Safety: A Personal Look"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

I started working as a deck sailor on a practical boat in the summer of 1991, covering substitutions for vacations. A year later, I experienced an accident in which a pilot lost his life.<\/strong> Beyond a brief piece of news, I was able to observe the consequences of the accident. Someone had to call his wife and tell her not to wait for him that night because there had been a problem. That event led me to take an interest in maritime safety, <\/strong>in which I have worked for years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When I was about to enter the night watch, I found the comrades I was supposed to relieve in shock. They told me that an ambulance had taken the pilot on duty in very bad condition. Incredulous, I asked them what had happened. As they explained to me, when trying to embark I had been trapped between the deck handrail of the boat and the side of the ship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There was not even bad weather. Apparently, there was only the usual seabed of summer afternoons left. The ladder hung on the stern fins, where the hull narrows, without resting completely against the side. The skipper had warned of the danger. He was a young professional, but with years of experience. The pilot insisted on doing so and the accident occurred.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While we waited to take another pilot, I heard from the radio station of a port policeman that the man had died during the transfer. <\/strong>Someone had to call his wife to tell her he wouldn’t be coming home. That human dimension rarely appears in the news.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When we arrived at the side of the ship with the next pilot, the disposition had changed. The scale was leeward, about half the length and supported along its entire length. Why had it not been arranged in this way from the beginning? Why was the warning of the skipper not sufficient to stop the shipment?<\/strong><\/mark><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I do not intend to reconstruct technical research from a memory, but I continue to ask myself: Is it enough to have the rules that regulate the means of embarkation? Is it not checked that they are complied with?<\/strong><\/mark> Responding requires everyone’s involvement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the biggest obstacles is normalize non-compliance.<\/strong> Repeating an operation without accidents does not make it safe, even if they say it ‘We always do it this way’. <\/strong>Feeling capable of overcoming a difficulty and using means of boarding that do not comply with the rules does not make these conditions acceptable. Experience should help us to recognize the limits, without letting routine hide the shortcomings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The means of embarkation are regulated in the Chapter V, Rule 23 of the SOLAS Convention,<\/strong> along with directives emanating from the International Maritime Organization.<\/strong> Even so, even today it is not difficult to find deficiencies in ships with up-to-date certificates and inspections. The documentation must be accompanied by an effective check of the conditions under which each transhipment takes place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After that accident, when I asked about the regulations, I was shown a poster that illustrated how to arrange the means of boarding. The instructions existed, but that did not ensure that they were known or used. Training should help to understand the requirements and recognize the danger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The responsibility lies with those who design, equip and inspect the ship and those who rig and use these means. The ship’s crew needs training; the pilot and the boat’s crew must communicate the deficiencies and have the support to demand their correction.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Inspections are part of this responsibility, but they must be provided with sufficient means and pay attention to the actual conditions of use. It is also essential that users report non-compliance, thus preventing other crew and pilot from facing the same danger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Delaying a manoeuvre can lead to stress, especially when safety is treated as an individual decision. If the person who detects a danger is afraid to be left alone in the face of these pressures, it becomes more difficult to stop the work. Therefore, the company’s support must be explicit, with clear procedures, verification of the means of embarkation and evaluation of the conditions.<\/strong> The participation of those who carry out the work allows these measures to be adapted to daily practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a backup to the procedures, a confidential notification method must be available to be able to report all kinds of concerns, failures, non-compliances and suggestions. This will turn security into something alive, capable of responding to the changing reality of work in the maritime field and will allow anyone who has something to say to participate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We must also listen to warnings regardless of who makes them. Turning a safety discrepancy into a matter of hierarchy makes it impossible to take advantage of the professional judgment of others. In that accident, the employer had identified the danger. Working as a team requires resolving doubts before continuing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The commitment to common security must be translated into the rejection of means of embarkation that do not comply with legal and security requirements, communicate the deficiencies and support these decisions, even if they alter the operation. There is little point in asking for security if the person who protects it is later questioned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To learn it is necessary to share information. CHIRP<\/a>, a British non-profit organization that deals with the human factor in security collects experiences through its independent and confidential notification program.<\/strong> Digital tools facilitate reporting, but it must be translated into improvements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, the campaign was also born in 2013 #Dangerousladders<\/a><\/strong>. A group of pilots and pilotboat crew, from several countries, who use social networks to denounce, with photos, the most dangerous means of boarding with the aim of raising awareness about the safety of pilots around the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We must also report when there is no material or physical damage. An event that almost ends in an accident (a ‘near miss’ or ‘near miss’) allows us to detect an unsafe practice before an accident with damage occurs. The reporter should know that his or her input is valuable and what measures have been taken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A subsequent evaluation will assess whether the proposed solution works and whether it has been disseminated among the rest of the workers. An incident cannot be closed exclusively on paper without the necessary checks in the actual operation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Confidentiality allows communication without fear of being singled out. That trust is maintained by heeding notices and incorporating lessons into training and procedures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For me, a safety culture is about recognizing risks and acting with collective support. The safety of the pilot is linked to that of the crews of the boat and the ship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

More than three decades later, I still remember that guard. Heeding a warning and correcting a deficiency in time may decide someone to return home.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

About the Author<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Ignacio Chofr\u00e9<\/strong> he began as a pilot ship sailor in 1991 in the port of Valencia, Spain, and spent 20 years as a pilot boat boatswain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After being closely involved in a fatal pilot accident in 1992, he developed a deep concern for safety. Ignacio has been very active on social media since 2013 trying to promote common safety and in 2017 he moved ashore to take charge of the Health and Safety of the <\/strong>Valencia Pilots.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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