Over the last decade, maritime-port digitalization has advanced with a clear objective: connecting actors and making operations more efficient. Success has been measured by how many sources are integrated and how quickly information circulates. Much less attention has received an essential element: the veracity and quality of the data used.
We’ve built systems that rely by default on what they receive. When trust is implicit, cybersecurity comes to the end of the project—a firewall, an audit, a contingency plan—rather than being a condition of design.
It is not a theoretical or distant discussion. In October 2019, a ransomware affected the Companhia Docas do Ceará, in Brazil: the system that manages the operation of the port of Fortaleza, from loading and unloading to billing, was left inaccessible, and the control of trucks and cargo had to be carried out at hand for days. In 2022, the group Accounts attacked the Costa Rican Ministry of Finance and left out of service the collection of foreign trade; the country declared a national emergency and in Puerto Caldera dispatch procedures had to be improvised. Outside the region, in 2023, attacks on Nagoya and a DP World Australia They paralyzed entire terminals for days. In all cases, the point of failure was the piece that integrated everything.
There are three fronts where this risk is often underestimated.
- 1. Technical-nautical coordination on a single platform
The trend is logical: to bring together pilotage, towing, mooring, VTS, maritime authority and terminal in the same environment. But a single platform also concentrates the risk. An erroneous ETA data, depth or site assignment no longer affects a single actor: it spreads to all of them at the same time and with the authority of an ‘official data’.
The design question is not only who accesses, but who can write, what is validated before publication, and what happens when two sources contradict each other. If the platform does not distinguish between verified data and a single received one, the operator will not be able to do so either.
- 2. Maintenance Digital Twins
Digital twins are presented as the culmination of asset management: buoys, beacons, fenders or cranes monitored in real time, with predictive maintenance. The twin inherits the quality of the data that feeds it. An uncalibrated sensor, altered telemetry or a manipulated history do not generate an alarm; they generate a wrong decision with the appearance of technical rigor.
In Aids to Navigation, the reading is straightforward. If the availability of an AtoN or the position of a buoy is reported from a remote system, that digital record becomes evidence of meeting availability targets. A twin that does not guarantee the integrity and traceability of its data not only optimizes poorly: it can hide a real fault behind a green indicator.
- 3. The silent dependence on GNSS
It is the least visible front. AIS, ECDIS, VTS, network synchronization, AtoN telemetry and digital twins depend on GNSS position and time. That dependency has rarely figured in risk analyses, although IALA it already addresses it in its Recommendation R0129 on GNSS vulnerability and mitigation measures.
According to a leading maritime intelligence firm, between June 13 and 24, 2025, more than 12,000 incidents of signal spoofing were recorded (Spoofing) that affected more than 3,000 ships; 97% appeared ‘jumping’ ashore, with false port calls. In the Strait of Hormuz, an average of 970 ships a day suffered interference, and the worst thing is that this problem is already being experienced in the American continent.
The consequences are no longer just statistics. On May 10, 2025, the container ship MSC Antonia, of about 7,000 TEUs, ran aground in the lowlands of Eliza, near Jeddah, in the Red Sea. Independent analyses by different organizations pointed to GNSS interference as a probable cause, although the shipping company has not confirmed it.
In March 2025, the IMO, the ICAO and the ITU issued a joint statement in which, with ‘grave concern,’ they urged States to protect satellite radio navigation, strengthen the resilience of the systems that depend on it, maintain backup infrastructure, and create interference reporting mechanisms.
For a port, the lesson is concrete: if its VTS, its synthetic or virtual AIS AtoN or its digital twin take the GNSS position as true, without checking it with radar, ground references or alternative time sources, the system will not detect the manipulation.
Four requirements for any port authority or operator.
The maritime industry has already taken a step: from 1 July 2024, the IACS UR E26 and E27 requirements are mandatory for new ships and require cyber resilience by design, both at the level of the ship and of each system on board. The principle is transferable to land.
- 1. Verifiable data integrity, not just availability. Each critical piece of data must indicate its origin, its timestamp and its level of validation, and the position sources must be contrasted with each other (GNSS vs. radar, AIS vs. fixed references).
- 2. The GNSS/PNT dependency, within the risk analysis. Identify which services depend on satellite position and time, how they behave in the face of interference, and what is their backing. It fits naturally into IALA’s risk management methodologies.
- 3. Defined and tested gradient modes. For the single platform, the VTS and the digital twin: what is done without the system, who decides and how the operation is restored. An untested procedure is only a guess.
- 4. Cybersecurity required from the time of hiring. Include segmented architecture, vulnerability management throughout the life cycle, event logging, obligation to report incidents – including GNSS interference – and cyber resilience acceptance tests, taking IACS UR E26/E27 and IEC 62443 as a reference.
A port’s digital maturity isn’t measured by how much data it connects, but by how much it can trust when it matters most. Integrating is the first step; verifying is what turns a digital system into a secure one.
About the Author
James Crawford He is the founder of AtoN & VTS and a retired officer of the Chilean Navy. An engineer in Maritime Administration and a master’s degree in Maritime Sciences, he specializes in aids to navigation, maritime cybersecurity and GNSS/PNT resilience. He directed the Maritime Signalling and Aids to Navigation Service for 11 years and currently advises on IALA matters.



